New York was the last state to adopt no-fault divorce. Since October 2010, a spouse can end a marriage by swearing that the relationship has broken down irretrievably for at least six months. That change did not erase the older grounds. Domestic Relations Law § 170 still lists adultery, cruel and inhuman treatment, abandonment, and imprisonment as independent grounds for divorce, and some clients still have good reasons to plead them. This page explains how each fault ground works, what you must prove, which defenses the other spouse can raise, and how fault does and does not affect money and custody.
A New York court can grant a divorce only on one of the grounds set out in DRL § 170. Four are fault grounds. Two rest on a period of living apart under a separation judgment or agreement. The seventh is the no-fault ground.
Most divorces filed today proceed under subdivision (7). If you want a plain explanation of that route, read our page on how no-fault divorce works in New York. The rest of this page addresses the fault grounds, with adultery first because it is the one clients ask about most.
The statute defines adultery narrowly. It is "the commission of an act of sexual intercourse, oral sexual conduct or anal sexual conduct, voluntarily performed by the defendant, with a person other than the plaintiff after the marriage of plaintiff and defendant." Three points follow from that language.
Adultery was a Class B misdemeanor under Penal Law § 255.17 for more than a century. The Legislature repealed that section in 2024. The repeal matters in divorce practice because a paramour called as a witness can no longer refuse to answer on the ground that the testimony would expose them to criminal prosecution for the act itself.
Adultery is the hardest ground to prove, and the difficulty comes from an evidence rule rather than the substantive law. CPLR 4502(a) provides that a husband or wife "is not competent to testify against the other in an action founded upon adultery, except to prove the marriage, disprove the allegation of adultery, or disprove a defense after evidence has been introduced tending to prove such defense." In practice, you cannot take the stand and describe what you saw or what your spouse confessed. The proof must come from somewhere else.
Direct eyewitness testimony of a sexual act is rare. New York courts accept circumstantial proof if it establishes both the opportunity to commit adultery and the inclination to do so. A hotel receipt alone shows opportunity. A hotel receipt combined with a private investigator's testimony that the defendant and a companion checked into a single room at 11 p.m., held hands in the lobby, and left together at 8 a.m. shows both. The trier of fact may then infer that the act occurred.
The plaintiff still testifies. CPLR 4502(a) permits testimony to prove the marriage and to rebut a defense once the defendant offers evidence of one. The plaintiff simply cannot supply the proof of the act itself.
DRL § 171 lists four defenses. If the defendant proves any of them, the court must deny the divorce on the adultery ground even if the adultery occurred.
The plaintiff cannot obtain a divorce for adultery that the plaintiff arranged or encouraged. Example: A husband hires a person to seduce his wife so he can have a ground for divorce. The wife proves the arrangement through the hired person's testimony. The claim fails.
The statute bars the claim where "the offense charged has been forgiven by the plaintiff." Forgiveness may be proved "either affirmatively, or by the voluntary cohabitation of the parties with the knowledge of the fact." Example: A wife learns in January that her husband had an affair. She confronts him, he apologizes, and they resume living together and sharing a bed through the following autumn. In November she files for divorce on adultery. The husband pleads condonation and points to ten months of voluntary cohabitation after she knew. The defense will very likely succeed. Note that condonation is conditional: if the husband commits adultery again after the reconciliation, the earlier act is revived and can be pleaded along with the new one.
DRL § 171(3) bars the action where it "was not commenced within five years after the discovery by the plaintiff of the offense charged." DRL § 210 imposes the same five-year limit on adultery and cruel and inhuman treatment generally. The clock runs from discovery, not from the act. Example: A husband's affair took place in 2016. His wife found out on March 10, 2019, when she saw the messages. She must file the summons no later than March 10, 2024. If she files on April 1, 2024, the adultery ground is time-barred, although she may still proceed on irretrievable breakdown.
DRL § 171(4) bars the claim where "the plaintiff has also been guilty of adultery under such circumstances that the defendant would have been entitled, if innocent, to a divorce." Both spouses cannot use each other's adultery as a sword. Example: A wife sues on adultery. The husband counterclaims and proves through an investigator that the wife had her own affair the previous year. Neither spouse obtains a divorce on the adultery ground. In this scenario, the court will usually grant the divorce under § 170(7) instead.
This ground requires proof that the defendant's conduct "so endangers the physical or mental well being of the plaintiff as renders it unsafe or improper for the plaintiff to cohabit with the defendant." The Court of Appeals set the standard in Hessen v. Hessen, 33 N.Y.2d 406 (1974): the longer the marriage, the higher the degree of proof required. Incompatibility, coldness, and ordinary arguments are not enough. A single episode of serious physical violence can suffice. A pattern of verbal degradation, threats, or humiliation can suffice if the plaintiff proves an effect on health, often through a treating physician or therapist.
DRL § 210 gives this ground a five-year limitation as well. The plaintiff may rely on a course of conduct, and the court will consider acts within the five years before filing while allowing older conduct as background. Cruel and inhuman treatment overlaps heavily with family offense proceedings. If your spouse's conduct includes assault, harassment, or stalking, our pages on domestic violence in New York divorce and orders of protection during divorce explain the parallel remedies available in Supreme Court and Family Court.
Abandonment comes in three forms, each requiring a full year before filing.
Worked example: A wife moved into a separate bedroom and refused all intimacy beginning June 1, 2023. Her husband asked to resume relations several times over the following months and was refused each time. He may file on constructive abandonment on or after June 1, 2024. If he filed on May 15, 2024, the ground would fail for want of the full year. Abandonment is a continuing wrong, so DRL § 210 exempts it from the five-year limitation.
The defendant must have been confined for three or more consecutive years after the marriage. Confinement before the wedding does not count. Like abandonment, this ground is exempt from the five-year limitation while the confinement continues, but the action must be brought within five years after release.
| Ground | Statute | Time element | Limitation | Proof challenge |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Adultery | DRL § 170(4) | Any time after marriage | 5 years from discovery (§ 171(3), § 210) | Spouse cannot testify to the act (CPLR 4502(a)) |
| Cruel and inhuman treatment | DRL § 170(1) | Course of conduct or single serious act | 5 years (§ 210) | Higher standard in long marriages (Hessen) |
| Abandonment | DRL § 170(2) | 1 year or more | None while continuing | Must show lack of consent and justification |
| Imprisonment | DRL § 170(3) | 3 consecutive years | 5 years after release | Certified prison records |
Clients often assume that proving adultery will produce a larger share of the assets or more maintenance. New York law says otherwise in almost every case.
DRL § 236(B)(5)(d) lists the factors a court weighs when dividing marital property. Marital fault is not among them. The Court of Appeals in O'Brien v. O'Brien, 66 N.Y.2d 576 (1985), and the Appellate Division in Blickstein v. Blickstein, 99 A.D.2d 287 (2d Dep't 1984), held that fault is considered only where the conduct is so egregious that it shocks the conscience of the court. Attempted murder of a spouse has met that test. Adultery, standing alone, has not.
There is one indirect exception. DRL § 236(B)(5)(d)(12) directs the court to consider "the wasteful dissipation of assets by either spouse." If your spouse spent $40,000 of marital savings on hotels, gifts, and travel for a paramour, that spending can be charged against your spouse's share. The claim rests on the dissipation, not the affair, so you prove it through bank and credit card records rather than through an adultery ground. This is frequently the more productive use of investigative resources.
The post-divorce maintenance factors in DRL § 236(B)(6)(e) likewise omit fault. Courts apply the statutory formula and adjust for the listed factors, such as the length of the marriage and the payee's earning capacity. If you left the workforce to raise children and your spouse had an affair, your maintenance claim rests on the first fact and not the second. Our page for stay-at-home spouses in New York divorce explains how that claim is built.
Custody turns on the best interests of the child under DRL § 240. A parent's affair is relevant only if it affected the child: for example, exposing a young child to a series of overnight partners, or neglecting parenting duties to pursue the relationship. Judges are alert to attempts to use adultery evidence as a custody weapon and tend to react poorly to it.
The action begins with a summons with notice or a summons and verified complaint filed in Supreme Court. DRL § 211 requires that the complaint be verified. The complaint must state the ground and, for adultery, the approximate time and place of the acts and the identity of the third party if known, or a statement that the identity is unknown. The plaintiff must satisfy the residency requirements of DRL § 230 as well.
Two procedural features distinguish fault cases from no-fault cases.
In an uncontested case, the defendant signs an affidavit admitting the ground or defaults. Fault grounds are rarely pleaded in uncontested matters now because § 170(7) requires no admission by the defendant and no proof beyond the plaintiff's sworn statement.
Given the cost of proof and the limited financial payoff, why plead fault at all? Several situations justify it.
We review what you have, tell you candidly whether it meets the proof standard under DRL § 170(4) and CPLR 4502(a), and calculate your filing deadline under DRL § 171(3). We then advise whether pleading adultery, pursuing a wasteful dissipation claim under DRL § 236(B)(5)(d)(12), or proceeding on irretrievable breakdown alone best serves your financial and custody goals. Where investigation is warranted, we coordinate with licensed investigators so that the evidence is admissible when it matters.
You can contact the Law Offices of Albert Goodwin by phone at 212-233-1233 or by email at [email protected].